Now although two [of these refutations] are not exact, (1) two at all events are! (For how is change in respect of owner different, that it is not an intrinsic disqualification? [Surely] because it is a mere intention! (2) Then change in respect of sanctity too is a mere intention! But what you must say is that since he intended it [for a wrongful purpose], he disqualified it; then here too, (3) since he intended it [for a different owner], he disqualified it. (4) Furthermore, according to R. Phinehas the son of R. Mari who maintained: Change in respect of owner does operate after death, (5) on two points at least you can refute it.) — Rather, said R. Ashi, Scripture says, And it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him,6 [implying,] but not for his fellow. (7) But does it come for this purpose? Surely it is required for what was taught: And it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him: R. Simeon said: Where [the sacrifice] is [a liability] upon him, he is responsible for its loss; where it is not [a liability] upon, him, he is not responsible for its loss, (8) And R. Isaac b. Abdimi said: What is the reason? Since he declared, ‘[I take] upon myself to bring an offering],’ it is as though he carried it on his shoulder! (9) — R. Ashi makes his deduction from ‘and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement, (10) We have now learned [it of] slaughtering and sprinkling: how do we know [it of] the receiving [of the blood]? And if you say, let us learn it from slaughtering and sprinkling, [it can be objected]: as for slaughtering and sprinkling, the reason is because [each is] a service which involves culpability [if performed] without [the Temple court]! (11) — Rather said R. Ashi: It is deduced from the Nazirites ram. For it is written, And he shall offer the ram for a slaughtering of peace-offerings, (12) [which teaches] that it must be offered specifically as a peace-offering. Now since this teaching is superfluous regarding change in respect of sanctity, as that is deduced from the other text, apply its teaching to change in respect of owner. R. Aha b. Abba said to Raba: Let us say, ‘he shall offer’ is a general proposition: (13) ‘slaughtering’ is a particularization: now [where we have] a general proposition followed by a particularization, [the rule is] the general proposition includes only what is contained in the particularization; hence slaughtering is so, (14) but every other service is not so? — If [Scripture] wrote, ‘He shall offer a peaceoffering as a slaughtering,’ it would be as you say. Since however it writes, ‘he shall offer for a slaughtering of peace offerings,’ It is an incomplete general proposition, (15) and an incomplete general proposition is not treated as a case of a general proposition followed by a particularization. Rabina said: In truth we do treat it as such, but ‘unto the Lord’ (16) is another general proposition. (17) R. Aha of Difti said to Rabina: But the first generalization is dissimilar from the last generalization, for the first includes [sacrificial] acts but nothing more, whereas the last one implies everything that is ‘unto the Lord’, even the pouring out of the residue [of the blood] and the burning of the emurim? (18) Behold the Tanna of the School of R. Ishmael (19) [even] in the case of a general proposition and particularization of this nature applies the rule that in a general proposition followed by a particularization and followed again by a general proposition you must be guided by the particularization: just as that is explicitly a [sacrificial] service, (20) and we require rightful intention, so in the case of every [sacrificial] service we require rightful intention. If so, [you may argue:] just as the particularization is explicitly a service which involves culpability [if it is performed] without [its legitimate boundaries], so is every service [included] which involves culpability [if performed] without; hence slaughtering and sprinkling are indeed included, but not receiving and carrying? or [you may argue]: as the particularization is explicitly something that must be done at the north [side of the altar] and is operative in the case of the inner sinofferings, so all [services] which must be done at the north and are operative in the case of the inner sin-offerings [are included]; hence slaughtering and receiving are indeed included, but not sprinkling? — You can argue in this way or in that way; they are equally balanced, and so both [arguments] are admissible. (21) (Another version: Each argument stands.) Alternatively, I can say, sprinkling follows from R. Ashi's deduction. (22) We have thus found [it true of] the Nazirites ram; how do we know [it of] the other peace-offerings? And if you say, Let us learn them from the Nazirites ram, [it can be argued:] As for the Nazirites ram, the reason is because other sacrifices (23) accompany it. (24) — If so, (25) Scripture should write, [And he shall offer the ram for. . .’] his peace-offerings; (26) why state, [for] peace-offerings? — In order to include all peace-offerings. We have thus found [it true of] peace-offerings; how do we know [it of] other sacrifices? And if you say, Let us learn them from peace-offerings, [it can be argued:] As for peace-offerings, the reason is because they require laying [of hands], libations, and the waving of the breast and shoulder! (27) Rather, Scripture says, This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering, and of the sin-offering, and of the guilt-offering, and of the consecrationoffering, and of the sacrifice of peaceofferings; (28) thus Scripture assimilates them to peace-offerings. Just as we require peaceofferings [to be offered] for their own sake, [thus forbidding] both change in respect of sanctity and change in respect of owner, so do we require all [sacrifices to be offered] for their own sake, [thus forbidding] both change in respect of sanctity and change in respect of owner. Let us say that if one slaughtered them in a different name they are invalid? — Scripture says, That which is gone out of thy lips thou shalt observe and do,’ as thou has vowed a nedabah [freewill-offering], etc.: (29) is this a freewill-offering — surely it is a vow? The meaning however is this: if you acted in accordance with your vow, let it be [the fulfillment of your] vow; but if not, let it count as a freewill-offering. (30) Now [both texts viz. . .] ‘that which is gone out of thy lips’ and ‘this is the law’, etc. , are required. (31) For if the Divine Law wrote, ‘that which is gone out of thy lips’ [only], I would say,

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(1). ↑ As it proceeds to explain.
(2). ↑ Nothing wrong is actually done to the sacrifice.
(3). ↑ Viz., in respect of wrongful ownership.
(4). ↑ Thus both can be regarded as intrinsic or nonintrinsic disqualifications.
(5). ↑ As a disqualification. The bracketed passage explains the two points in which they are not really different.
(6). ↑ Lev. I, 4.
(7). ↑ This proves that the ‘sprinkling’ which effects the atonement must be performed in the name of its owner.
(8). ↑ If a man declares, ‘I vow an animal for a sacrifice,’ he thereby undertakes a liability. If he subsequently sets aside an animal and it dies or is lost before it is sacrificed, he must replace it. But if he declared, ‘I vow this animal for a sacrifice,’ he accepted no liability beyond that animal, and if it dies his obligations ceases. R. Simeon deduces it from the verse quoted, which he renders and interprets thus: And it shall be accepted for him. When is it accepted for him? When its effect is to make atonement in which case he does not bring another. Hence if it did not make atonement, he must bring another. And when must he bring another in order to make atonement (i.e. to be quit of his obligation)? When he declared it a liability upon him’ (E.V. for him). Sh. M.
(9). ↑ As though he had it in his care all the time, and until it is actually sacrificed his vow is not fulfilled. Thus the verse is required for a different purpose.
(10). ↑ Which implies: it must be ‘for him to make atonement ‘but not for another to make atonement. Whereas R. Simeon's deduction is from ‘upon him’ as stated in end of n. 9, p. 14.
(11). ↑ But there is no culpability if the other two services (receiving and carrying of the blood) are done outside their legitimate boundaries.
(12). ↑ Num. VI, 17.
(13). ↑ ‘He shall offer (lit. ‘do’)’ is a term embracing all services, while ‘slaughtering’ is a particular one.
(14). ↑ I.e. , the deduction made regarding change in respect of owner applies to slaughtering.
(15). ↑ ‘He shall offer’ obviously requires the completion of ‘peace-offerings’ before we know to what it refers at all; ‘slaughtering’ however interposes, and therefore it is only an incomplete generalization.
(16). ↑ The continuation of this verse.
(17). ↑ For it implies any service performed ‘unto the Lord.’ Thus we have a general proposition followed by a particularization and followed again by a general proposition. The exegetical rule then is that the general proposition includes all things similar to the particularization, and thus the other services are included.
(18). ↑ Whereas only the four services under discussion are sacrificial acts.
(19). ↑ Who formulated thirteen rules of exegesis, including this one.
(20). ↑ Sc. slaughtering.
(21). ↑ Since one approach includes slaughtering and sprinkling, and the other includes slaughtering and receiving, you must admit both, since neither is stronger than the other. Carrying too is then included, for it is really ‘a part of the act of receiving.
(22). ↑ Supra, from the verse ‘and it shall be accepted for him, etc.; hence the present deduction must be in respect of receiving.
(23). ↑ Lit., ‘blood’,
(24). ↑ And it is natural that one cannot be sacrificed in the name of one person and a second in the name of another, when all are for the same person. The other sacrifices are the sin-offering and the burnt-offering.
(25). ↑ If the deduction of the verse were intended to be confined to this particular sacrifice.
(26). ↑ V. marginal gloss.
(27). ↑ But no other sacrifices require all these, and consequently they may be offered under another designation either in respect of sanctity or of ownership.
(28). ↑ Lev. VII, 37.
(29). ↑ Deut. XXIII, 24.
(30). ↑ V. supra. Since it counts as a freewill-offering, it is obviously valid.
(31). ↑ One might argue that the text, ‘that which... . lips’, etc., itself proves that a sacrifice must in the first place at least be offered for its own sake. Hence the Talmud proceeds to show that that is not so.